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Choice of Law for Professional
Responsibility Issues in Aggregate
Litigation
Nancy J. Moore*
As the rest of the papers in this symposium issue
demonstrate, aggregate litigationi raises difficult, often
intractable choice-of-law issues for judges, as well as for litigants
and their lawyers. Typically, judges must choose among rules
governing not only substantive law, but also statutes of
limitations, allocation of damages, and punitive damages. 2 What
is less well-recognized is that aggregate litigation may also
present difficult choice-of-law issues regarding the ethical conduct
of the lawyers involved in these cases. So far, these issues have
barely surfaced, not because professional responsibility questions
have not been raised with respect to aggregate litigation, but
rather because most courts apparently assume either that there
are no significant differences among the relevant choices 3 or that
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of
Law. My thanks to Professor Louise Teitz for inviting me to participate in
this symposium issue.
1. For a definition of "aggregate litigation" see infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 6 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Daynard v. Ness, 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18-19 (D. Mass. 2001)
(assuming that all five relevant jurisdictions followed ABA Model Rule 8.5
with respect to the treatment of lawyers licensed by only one state); see also
infra note 89 and accompanying text (pointing out that the court's
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it is obvious which jurisdiction's rules apply. 4 As for the former
assumption, it may once have been true that the ethical landscape
was similar no matter where a lawyer practiced; however, over the
past few decades jurisdictions have developed increasingly
divergent professional responsibility law, whether by adopting
different rules of professional conduct or by interpreting the same
rules differently. 5 As for the latter assumption, it may be true that
representation in litigation raises fewer professional responsibility
choice of law questions than other types of representation; 6
nevertheless, representation in litigation poses far more difficult
choice of law questions than has generally been recognized. And,
of course, any difficulties presented by ordinary two-party
litigation are necessarily multiplied when the litigation is
complex.
Until recently, professional responsibility choice of law
issues were rarely raised even in two-party litigation. Most
lawyers tried cases in the states where they were licensed, and the
professional responsibility rules were often the same wherever a
case was tried. 7 This is no longer the case. Recent decades have
witnessed an "incredible growth in law firms with multistate
branch offices and a growing need for litigation and transactional
assumptions were incorrect as to three of the five jurisdictions); see also infra
note 86 and accompanying text (recognizing, however, that the jurisdictions'
rules on the ethical permissibility of fee-splitting agreements were different).
4. See, e.g., In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 687-688 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing the district court's adoption of the New Jersey rule regulating conflicts
of interest for determining the propriety of the conduct of the proposed
lawyer for debtor in bankruptcy, who also represented some of the claimants
with asbestos claims against the debtor, including the validity of waivers
under claimants' fee agreements with lawyer and co-counsel, even though the
agreements were entered into prior to the bankruptcy filing, without any
discussion of a potential choice-of-law problem).
5. See, e.g., H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in
the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 91-97 (1997) (including
disparate approaches taken by federal district courts). Aside from the
disparity in the rules of professional conduct, there is disparity in a variety of
"other" law that may be applicable to lawyer conduct, including malpractice
law, contract law, criminal law, and the rules of civil and criminal procedure,
torts, and criminal law). See id. at 98.
6. See Carla C. Ward, Comment, The Law of Choice: Implementation of
the ABA Model Rule 8.5, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 173, 178-79 (2006).
7. See Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional
Practice, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 747 (1995).
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legal services that cross state lines." Moreover, although there
was some variation in the versions of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility adopted by almost all states shortly
after its initial promulgation in 1969, the more halting acceptance
of both the original 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and its subsequent amendments have led to increasing
conflicts. 9 It is only a matter of time before the choice of law issues
raised by these conflicts come to the surface.
The purpose of this brief essay is two-fold. First, I want to
note the extent to which professional responsibility choice-of-law
issues in litigation may be more complicated than is currently
thought to be the case, even when the lawsuits are the typical two-
party variety. Second, I want to briefly sketch the nature of the
additional complexities posed by aggregate litigation, including
both class actions and individual lawsuits that have been
aggregated (whether formally or informally) for various purposes.
It is not my intention to offer either a comprehensive examination
of these difficult issues or a specific proposal to resolve them.
Rather, my goal is more modestly to raise consciousness about the
nature of the professional responsibility choice-of-law issues that
judges, litigants and their lawyers will almost certainly be
confronting in the near and distant future.
Two-PARTY LITIGATION
Prior to 1993, the ABA model codes provided no special rule
regarding choice-of-law for disciplinary proceedings. 10 The issue
was first mentioned in the Comment to Rule 8.5 of the initial 1983
version of the ABA Model Rules, which merely stated that when
lawyers practice law in jurisdictions other than the one in which
8. Moulton, supra note 5, at 82-83.
9. See, e.g., id. at 88-90. In addition to the differences in the professional
conduct rules adopted by the states, there is considerable variation among
the professional conduct rules adopted by federal district courts, including
differences between some federal district courts and the states in which they
sit. See e.g., 30 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
§802.06 (3d ed. 2008); Edward A. Carr and Allan Van Fleet, Professional
Responsibility Law in Multijurisdictional Litigation: Across the Country and
Across the Street, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 859, 894-905 (1995); Stephen B. Burbank,
State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and
Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969 (1992)
10. See Daly supra note 7, at 742-756.
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they are licensed, or when they are licensed to practice in more
than one jurisdiction, the "principles of conflict of laws" or
"applicable rules of choice of law may apply." 11 In 1993, Rule 8.5
was amended to provide, for the first time, an explicit choice-of-
law rule for disciplinary actions. A new subsection (b) stated:
Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional
conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a
court before which a lawyer has been admitted to
practice (either generally or for purposes of that
proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the rules
of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the
rules of the court provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct
(i) if the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this
jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the
rules of this jurisdiction, and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and
another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall
be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in
which the lawyer principally practices; provided,
however, that if particular conduct clearly has its
predominant effect in another jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules
of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that
conduct. 12
11. See Daly supra note 7, at 750-751 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R 8.5, cmt. 2-3 (1983)).
12. Id. at 757-58. This amendment was the subject of a 1995 symposium
sponsored by the South Texas Law Review. See Theresa Stanton Collett,
Foreward Symposium: Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law, 36
S. TEX. L. REV. 657 (1995). Many of the articles cited in this essay, including
Professor Daly's, are from that symposium.
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The goal of the drafters in providing a separate choice-of-
law rule for disciplinary proceedings was to establish "relatively
simple, bright-line rules"'13 in this area, as opposed to general
choice-of-law doctrine, which has been described as "an approach,
a methodology, or a set of factors to consider in choosing the
applicable laws". 14 According to subsequent commentators, "[w]ith
the possible exception of subsection (b)(1), the provision relating to
litigation, it is highly questionable whether the drafters
accomplished their goal". 15 Thus, with respect to subsection (b)(2),
commentators quickly recognized that there were serious
ambiguities arising from the difficulty of determining where a
lawyer admitted in more than one state "principally practices," as
well as determining where the "predominant effect" of particular
conduct occurred. 16
With respect to (b)(1), however, it was often assumed that
the rules dealing with a lawyer's conduct in a judicial setting were
easily determined because the rule of the forum state exclusively
applies. 17 Even here, there were several commentators who
13. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF'L RESP., RECOMMENDATION AND
REPORT TO THE H.D. 4 (1993) [hereinafter ABA RECOMMENDATION AND
REPORT]; see also Daly, supra note 7, at 757.
14. Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and the Multistate
Attorney, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 799, 830 (1995); see also Daly, supra note 7, at
757.
15. Daly supra note 7, at 758.
16. See, e.g., id. at 760-761; Moulton, supra note 5, at 157; Carol A.
Needham, The Multijurisdictional Practice of Law and the Corporate Lawyer:
New Rules for a New Generation of Legal Practice, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1075,
1095-1100 (1995). Subsection (b)(2) was also criticized for limiting choice of
law to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer was admitted, thus ignoring the
possibility that either the lawyer's conduct or the predominant effect of that
conduct might occur in jurisdiction in which the lawyer was practicing law
without permission to do so. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 7, at 761-764. Yet
another criticism was that the rule is "lawyer-centered," meaning that it aims
to benefit lawyers by giving them predictability and ignores the "just and
predictable treatment of clients or the interests of competing jurisdictions in
having their law applied in particular cases." Moulton, supra note 5, at 158.
17. See, Ward, supra note 6. ("[t]he [1993] amendment sought to provide
clear solutions to choice-of-law problems resulting in various state ethics
rules. It made clear that [in litigation] the ethical rules of the tribunal, and
only those rules, would apply. The main ambiguity was which rule or rules
should apply in non-judicial proceedings.") (footnotes omitted); see also ABA
RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT supra note 13, at 4 (proposing that in
litigation, the ethical rules of the tribunal, and only those rules, would apply).
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recognized potential difficulties, principally involving the
applicability of the litigation rule to conduct that occurs prior to
the filing of any court proceeding, including ex parte interviews
with employees of a potential opposing party,'8 as well as the
negotiation and execution of agreements for contingent fees or fee
divisions among lawyers, all of which involve rules that tend to
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 19 Because there were so few
decisions addressing professional responsibility choice-of-law
issues, whether in judicial proceedings or otherwise, these
potential difficulties were rarely addressed. Some courts
apparently understood the subsection to apply broadly to include
all activity even remotely "in connection with" a pending or
potential judicial proceeding, such as legal fees, 20 while others
applied it to post-filing conduct, typically conduct in the
proceeding itself, such as filing a frivolous lawsuit 2 ' or disclosure
of confidential information in a motion to withdraw. 22 In neither
situation did the opinions explain the reasoning underlying the
decision to apply the subsection either broadly or narrowly.
In 2002, Rule 8.5 was amended yet again, this time as part
of a comprehensive effort to revise the rules in recognition of the
increasingly multijurisdictional nature of law practice. 23
Subsection (b) now provides:
Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of
18. See Daly, supra note 7, at 759-760.
19. See Carr and Van Fleet, supra note 9, at 892- 894.
20. See, e.g., In re Bernstein, 774 A.2d 309, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(assuming without deciding that D.C. should have applied Virginia rules to
charges involving excessive fees, commingling, and dishonesty in connection
with fees charged to client for representation in a Virginia proceeding).
21. See, e.g., In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Wis. 2003) (applying the
1993 version of Rule 8.5(b)(1), stating that filing a frivolous lawsuit in
Michigan was governed by the Michigan rules because it was "alleged
misconduct that occurred in a proceeding before a court in the state of
Michigan"); but cf. Daynard v. Ness, 178 F.Supp.2d 9, 18-19 (D. Mass. 2001)
(assuming without discussion that subsection (b)(2) of 1993 version of Rule
8.5 applied to determine the ethical propriety of a fee-splitting agreement
among lawyers regarding pending litigation).
22. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(applying Virginia's disciplinary rules to a lawyer charged with misconduct in
revealing a client's secrets in a motion to withdraw from a Virginia
proceeding).
23. See generally Stephen Gillers, Lessons From the Multijurisdictional
Practice Commission: The Art of Making Change, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 685, 715
(2002).
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this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied
shall be as follows:
for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a
tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits,
unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which
the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the
conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction
shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to
discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur. 24
There are four significant changes from the 1993 version of
the rule. First, subsection (b)(1) has been expanded to include any
matter pending before a "tribunal," which includes not only
judicial proceedings, but also arbitrations (but not mediations). 25
Second, by providing that the subsection applies to conduct in
connection with a matter "pending" before a tribunal, the drafters
signaled that pre-litigation activity will be governed by (b)(2), a
conclusion reinforced by explicit language in the Comment. 26
Third, for pre-filing and other conduct not "in connection with" a
pending proceeding, the rule to be applied is no longer tied to a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice, but rather
is determined either by the jurisdiction in which the conduct
occurs or, if different, by the jurisdiction in which the predominant
effect of the conduct occurs. Fourth, at least for purposes of
subsection (b)(2), the rule provides a safe harbor for lawyers who
make reasonable decisions about where the predominant effect of
their conduct will occur and act accordingly.27
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (2007).
25. See id. R. 1.0(m) (defining "[t]ribunal" to denote "a court, an
arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceedings or a legislative body,
administrative agency or other body acting in a judicial capacity").
26. Id. R. 8.5 cmt. n. 4 (paragraph (b)(2) applies to "all other conduct,
including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a
tribunal").
27. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-
first Century, 30 HOFSTRA L.REv. 923, 943 (2002) (commenting on the Ethics
2000 Commission proposal that led to the recommendations of the
Multijurisdictional Practice Commission).
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Thirty-seven states have already adopted amendments to
Rule 8.5 that are either identical or similar to the ABA Model
Rule, and an additional five states have study committees that
have recommended either identical or similar amendments.2 8 This
leaves, however, a significant number of jurisdictions that may not
adopt the amendments any time in the near future, including not
only the remaining state courts, 29 but also federal courts that
automatically follow the rule in the non-adopting states in which
they sit,30 as well as federal courts that follow some other set of
rules. 31 In these non-adopting jurisdictions, questions will
continue to arise concerning the applicability of subsection (b)(1)
to pre-filing litigation activities, including ex parte interviews
with employees of a potential opposing party and ethical issues
arising out of contingent fees or fee divisions among lawyers. 32
But what about the adopting jurisdictions? Have the most
recent amendments to subsection (b)(1) eliminated the
ambiguities that arise in applying that section? 33 Have new
ambiguities been created? In my view, significant difficulties
remain in interpreting and applying even the current ABA version
of Rule 8.5 to the conduct of litigators, both before and after a
matter has been filed.
For example, it is not clear to me that all post-filing conduct
28. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Quick Guide Chart
on State Adoption of Rule 8.5, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/quick-
guide_8.5.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
29. Some states may adopt versions of Rule 8.5 that vary in significant
parts from the current ABA Model Rule. For example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has proposed adopting (b)(1) as is, but amending
(b)(2) to provide that in transactional matters and in litigation before a
lawsuit is filed, the default rule will be "the rules of the jurisdiction where the
lawyer maintains his or her principal office." See, e.g., Mass. Supreme
Judicial Court invites comments on proposed change to professional conduct
rule, Mass. Law. Wkly, May 12, 2008, 1.
30. See, e.g., Moulton, supra note 5, at 97-99 (discussing that the
majority of federal district courts incorporate by local rules the conduct rules
of the state in which they sit).
31. See, e.g., id. at 99 (discussing the variety of approaches taken by
federal district courts, including adoption of the ABA Model Rules or the ABA
Model Code, even when the ABA model differs from the local state version, as
well as adoption of both an ABA model and local state standards); see also
MOORE et. al. supra note 9 for a comprehensive chart setting forth the
positions taken by each of the federal district courts.
32. See supra notes 17, 18, 19, and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
2009] PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES 81
of a lawyer will be covered by subsection (b)(1). Consider a lawyer
who requests or agrees to a modification of a fee agreement
(contingent or otherwise) that was initially entered into prior to
the filing of a lawsuit. According to current Rule 8.5, the rules of
professional conduct governing the initial agreement are not
(necessarily) those of the jurisdiction where the lawsuit will be
filed, but rather those of the jurisdiction where the agreement was
entered into or where its predominant effects will occur. Assume
that the lawyer and client both reside in State A, but the lawsuit
will be filed in State B, where the lawyer expects to be admitted
pro hac vice. State A rules will probably govern the initial fee
agreement, as that is where the fee agreement was most likely
entered into and where its predominant effect will occur. 34 Can it
possibly be the case that once the lawsuit is filed, any modification
of that fee agreement is now governed by the rules of State B?
State A may provide for contingent fee caps different from those, if
any, of State B, or perhaps State A has a different provision for
the permissibility of fee division among lawyers. The lawyer may
argue for the continuing applicability of the rules of State A on the
ground that her post-filing conduct is not sufficiently "in
connection with" the pending lawsuit. 35 There is no apparent
34. Cf. Bernick v. Frost, 510 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(using "most significant relationship" test, court applied law of New Jersey to
contingent fee contract between New Jersey residents executed in New
Jersey for lawsuit to be filed in New York); In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d 836, 846
(Wis. 2003) (applying the 1993 version of Rule 8.5(b)(1), stating that filing a
frivolous lawsuit in Michigan was governed by the Michigan rules because it
was "alleged misconduct that occurred in a proceeding before a court in the
state of Michigan"); but cf. State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Profl and Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. RI-122 (1992) (stating that when personal injury case will
be tried in Michigan state courts, lawyer will be governed by Michigan cap on
contingent fee, even if client resides in a state where larger fees are
permissible); Fla State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof l Ethics, Op. 88-10 (1988)
(stating that in applying choice-of-law principles to determine whether
Florida contingent fee schedule and client statement of rights provisions
apply to fee division agreements involving Florida Bar members practicing or
residing out of state, committee gives weight not only to the client's state of
residence, but also to the state where the cause of action arose and the state
where suit may be filed). One reason why the rules of the state of both the
client's and the lawyer's residence may apply is that at the time the fee
agreement is executed, the parties may not know where the litigation will be
filed.
35. See, e.g., Carol A. Needham, The Multijurisdictional Practice of Law
and the Corporate Lawyer: New Rules for a New Generation of Legal Practice,
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reason why all aspects of the fee agreement should not be
governed by the same rules, and so this argument has some
plausibility. Moreover, the same argument can be made with
respect to other ethical issues that span both pre- and post-filing
conduct, such as a conflict of interest that arises pre-filing but
worsens over the course of the litigation. 36
In contrast to the ambiguity regarding the applicability of
subsection (b)(1) to at least some post-filing activities of a lawyer,
pre-filing activities are now clearly governed by subsection
(b)(2). 37 But the revisions to (b)(2) may have made it even more
difficult for courts to apply that subsection. Under the 1993
version of (b)(2), if a lawyer was admitted in only one jurisdiction,
the rules of that jurisdiction applied in all cases. If the lawyer was
admitted in more than one jurisdiction, the only choice was among
those jurisdictions in which the lawyer was admitted, in which
case the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally
practiced would apply, unless that conduct "clearly" had its
predominant effect in another admitting jurisdiction. 38 Yes, there
were ambiguities under the 1993 version of Rule 8.5, 39 but these
ambiguities were fairly limited.40
36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1075, 1094 (1995) (noting in regard to the 1993 version of
Rule 8.5(b)(1) that "[s]ome clarification is.. .needed regarding.. .exactly how
related the lawyer's conduct must be before it is deemed to undertaken 'in
connection with' the litigated matter"). For example, assume the defendant
causes the lawsuit to be removed from state to federal court or from one
federal district to another. If the rules of these courts differ, does that mean
that modifications to the fee agreement are governed by the rules of whatever
court the lawsuit happens to be pending at the time of the fee modification?
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. d
(if there is a material change in the reasonable expectations of client giving
informed consent to a conflict, client must be informed of new conditions and
new informed consent obtained.). See also, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (advance waiver of a conflict will not be
effective if the circumstances that materialize would make the conflict
nonconsentable).
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
38. See Daly, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39. See id.
40. I do not mean to suggest that the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 was
preferable because its ambiguities were more limited. As the Chief Reporter
of the Ethics 2000 Commission, I was the principal drafter of the Ethics 2000
version of the amendment that was ultimately proposed in substantially the
same form by the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission. Both the Ethics
2000 Commission and I agreed that the 1993 version of the rule was deficient
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Under the 2002 version, however, the applicable choice of
law under (b)(2) depends in each case on the court determining,
first, where the conduct occurred and, second, whether the
predominant effect occurred in a different jurisdiction. Given the
ability of lawyers and clients to communicate with each other and
with others by telephone, fax, email, and videoconferencing,
difficult questions may arise concerning the site of the relevant
conduct. 41 Even more difficult may be the determination of where
the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct occurred, as when a
lawyer conducts an ex parte interview of a corporate employee at
the branch office of a likely opponent, whose headquarters is
located in another state, and the lawyer obtains statements from
the employee that may be admissible in a lawsuit likely to be filed
in yet a third state, where the plaintiff resides.
Anticipating this difficulty, the drafters included a
provision in subsection (b)(2) that "[a] lawyer shall not be subject
to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer. reasonably believes the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur."42 Of course,
reasonable minds might differ as to whether a lawyer's belief was
"reasonable." In addition, this safe harbor provision (which exists
only in (b)(1) and not in (b)(2)43) applies by its terms only in
lawyer disciplinary actions 44 and not in other proceedings in
because it ignored the legitimate interests of parties other than the lawyer
themselves. See supra note 16; infra Conclusion.
41. See, e.g., Birbrower v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 2-3, 5-6 (Cal. 1998)
(invalidating fee agreement because New York lawyer engaged in
unauthorized practice of law in California; reasoning that "one may practice
law in the state although not physically present here by advising a California
client on California law in connection with a California legal dispute by
telephone, fax, computer, or other modern technological means").
42. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43. I was the Chief Reporter for the Ethics 2000 Commission, which
originally proposed this language. See Moore, supra note 27, At 943. As the
principal drafter for this provision, I can attest that the Commission did not
specifically address this discrepancy. In all likelihood, the Commission was
unaware at the time of the ambiguities existing in subsection (b)(1) and thus
did not see the need for a safe harbor with respect to that provision. In my
view, bar counsel and committees or courts interpreting and applying this
provision should exercise their discretion and give lawyers who make
reasonable choices under subsection (b)(1) the same benefit of the doubt in
disciplinary proceedings.
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope [201 (2007) ("The Rules
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which the lawyer's conduct might be questioned, such as fee
disputes or motions for disqualification. 45 Consider, for example, a
fee dispute in which the jurisdictions in question have
significantly different rules on applicable contingent fee caps. 46
Here the court will have no choice but to apply the law of one of
the relevant jurisdictions in order to resolve the dispute, even if
the lawyer conducted herself reasonably in choosing to follow the
rules of a different jurisdiction, thereby avoiding discipline.
The existence of remedies other than lawyer discipline
raises additional choice-of-law problems for even the ordinary two-
party lawsuit. This is because, as noted above, rules of
professional conduct, by their terms, apply only in disciplinary
proceedings. 47 As a result, although violation of these rules may
be considered as relevant evidence in other types of proceedings, 48
courts are free to apply "other" law, 49 including modifications of
the disciplinary rules. A classic example involves lawyer
disqualification for conflicts of interest. Many courts view
disqualification not as a sanction for unethical conduct, but rather
as a remedy reserved for the protection of clients, former clients or
the integrity of the proceedings. 50 As such, some of these courts
have developed standards for disqualification that are "less
restrictive and less categorical" 51 than the otherwise applicable
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies."). Nevertheless, it is
generally acknowledged that "a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence
of breach of the applicable standard of conduct." Id.
45. See supra note 9; infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. In some
other proceedings, something like a safe harbor may be applicable; for
example, in fee forfeiture proceedings, forfeiture is not appropriate unless the
lawyer has committed a "clear and serious violation of a duty to a client."
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000). Similarly, in
negligence actions, the lawyer's conduct is measured by the standard of the
skill and knowledge normally possessed by other lawyers, a standard that
allows competent lawyers to "reasonably exercise professional judgment in
different ways." Id at § 52 cmt. b.
46. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Comm'n. on Profl and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. RI-122 (1992).
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope [20].
49. Moulton, supra note 5, at 98.
50. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979).
51. Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 73 (1996).
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rules of professional conduct, which are prophylactic in nature. 52
A court asked to disqualify a lawyer for one of the parties in
a simple, two-party lawsuit is almost certain to apply the
disqualification law of that court.53 In other contexts, however,
the question of which jurisdiction's law to apply may involve more
difficult choice-of-law analysis. For example, consider a fee
agreement that may be unethical, depending on which of several
possible jurisdictions' rules are thought to apply. 54 Was the
agreement unethical? If so, should the court nevertheless enforce
the agreement? And if the court is unwilling to enforce the
agreement, may the lawyer nevertheless recover in quantum
meruit? In deciding whether the fee agreement was unethical, the
court will probably look to Rule 8.5 or its equivalent for choice-of-
law guidance. 55 But this is not a disciplinary proceeding, and as
a result, it might be unclear which jurisdiction's version of Rule
8.5 should apply. 56 In making this choice-of-law decision, as well
as deciding which jurisdiction's law to apply to both the
enforceability of unethical fee agreements and the right to recover
52. See id. at 71-72.
53. I am unaware of any court opinion that directly addresses the "choice
of law" issue raised as to whose law of disqualification applies. Rather, courts
simply apply the common law body of jurisprudence on the appropriateness of
disqualification that has been developed in that court. See 30 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, at §807.02[6][b] (discussing how federal
courts may look to state court rules to determine whether an ethical violation
has occurred, but then consider the remedy for any such violation in the
context of a body of jurisprudence focused on the particular remedy, such as
disqualification).
54. See, e.g., Daynard v. Ness, 178 F.Supp.2d 9 (D. Mass. 2001) This case
is discussed more fully at infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
55. See id. at 14-19 (discussing the different requirements of the
disciplinary rules of several jurisdictions in a lawsuit seeking to enforce an
allegedly unethical oral fee-splitting agreement, as well as the applicability of
Rule 8.5 to determine which jurisdiction's rules should apply); see also infra
notes 84-95 and accompanying text (Daynard is it itself an example of
aggregate litigation, since it involved a lawsuit brought by a single plaintiff
against several defendants, thereby complicating the analysis. In addition,
the underlying fee agreement was made in the context of highly complex
aggregate litigation, i.e., multiple class actions brought in many different
jurisdictions).
56. In Daynard, the court believed that each of the relevant jurisdictions
had adopted the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 (and thus it didn't matter which
jurisdiction's rule was applied), but this was not in fact the case. See infra
notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
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in quantum meruit, courts are unlikely to look to any version of
Rule 8.5, but almost certainly will be forced to apply more
traditional choice-of-law principles. 57
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
As defined by the American Law Institute's current project
on the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, aggregate
proceedings include: single lawsuits encompassing claims or
defenses of multiple parties; formal collections of related lawsuits
(either individual or aggregate) proceeding in whole or in part
under common judicial supervision or control; and informal
collections of claims of multiple parties proceeding under common
nonjudicial supervision or control. 58 This wide range of complex
litigation complicates professional responsibility choice-of-law
issues in a number of ways.
Consider first a lawsuit in which a lawyer represents
multiple plaintiffs in a single lawsuit against a single defendant.
The multiple plaintiffs may reside in different states, each of
which has a different rule on contingent fee caps. 59 Prior to the
filing of the lawsuit, Rule 8.5 directs that the ethical propriety of
the contingent fee agreements should be determined by subsection
(b)(2). Did the lawyer's conduct occur where the lawyer prepared
and perhaps sent the agreements to the clients or did it occur
where the agreements were executed? 60 Does it matter whether
57. See Daynard, infra note 91 (containing a wide-ranging discussion of
the choice-of-law questions raised, as well as possible approaches to resolve
those questions, in a lawsuit seeking to enforce the enforceability of an oral
fee-splitting agreement).
58. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §
1.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008) [hereinafter "ALI PRINCIPLES"].
59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60. With respect to determining the validity of contracts generally,
choice-of-law principles often look to the "place of contracting" as one of
several relevant facts. The place of contracting is the place where the last act
necessary to give the contract binding effect occurred. This will typically be
where the offer is accepted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF
LAWS § 188 cmt. e (1971). When the question is not the validity of the
contract, but rather the ethical propriety of the lawyer's conduct, it may be
more relevant to determine the place where the lawyer made an offer that
was itself improper. Of course, general choice-of-law principles do not give
place of contracting, standing alone, any particular importance, but rather
treat it as one of several factors to consider in determining which state has
the most significant contacts with the contract. Id.
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the clients came to the lawyer's office to execute the agreement (in
a state different than their place of residence) or whether the
agreements were signed by the clients in their homes and then
mailed back to the lawyer? Where is the predominant effect of any
violation of the contingent fee rules? Based on prior case law,
courts may find that the predominant effect of fee agreements
(regardless of where they were executed) usually occurs in the
multiple jurisdictions where the various clients reside, not in the
single jurisdiction where the lawsuit is likely to be filed. 61 As a
result, the lawyer may enter into different contingent fee
arrangements with each plaintiff, thereby creating a potential
conflict of interest, since the lawyer now has an incentive to favor
those plaintiffs whose agreements provide for a larger contingent
fee. 62 Similar conflicts may arise when the lawyer has agreements
with some but not all of the clients to share legal fees with
referring lawyers, thereby creating an incentive for the lawyer to
favor those clients whose entire fee belongs to the lawyer. 63
Moreover, the question of the ethical propriety of these fee
division agreements with referring lawyers (who may themselves
practice in a variety of different states) is itself subject to choice-
of-law analysis. 64 And whereas courts may find that the
predominant effect of a lawyer-client fee agreement occurs where
the client resides, once the litigation is completed, the client may
have little or no interest in how the lawyers divide the fee. 65
Class actions are another common form of aggregated
litigation. Ethics issues may arise either pre- or post-filing (or
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
62. Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, there is a
concurrent conflict of interest if "there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited . . . by a
personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2)
(2007).
63. This may have occurred in a recent case alleging that a plaintiffs'
firm misrepresented the manner in which an aggregate settlement had been
negotiated in order to hide the fact that a major factor in determining each
client's share was whether the client had retained the firm directly or been
referred by another firm. See Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute's
Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients
Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 409, n. 83
(2008) [hereinafter Moore, ALI's Draft Proposal].
64. See Carr and VanFleet, supra note 9, at 892, n. 162.
65. Daynard, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
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both), including the solicitation of potential class representatives,
ex-parte interviews with employees of potential opponents, and
conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's representation of
individuals either inside or outside the potential class. 66 In many
class actions, there will be multiple defendants with principal
places of business in different states, as well as both multiple class
representatives and multiple lawyers hoping to represent the
class, some of whom reside or practice in different states. 67 In
addition, multiple plaintiffs' or defendants' lawyers may engage in
coordinated activity that occurs simultaneously in different places,
and much of this activity may occur pre-filing, thereby clearly
invoking the application of subsection (b)(2). Where does such
conduct occur? Will the lawyers' conduct be judged by different
rules depending on where similar meetings take place or where
the various parties reside? And where is the predominant effect of
such disparate but coordinated activity? If the lawyers know in
advance where the lawsuit will be filed, perhaps the site of such a
lawsuit may be where the predominant effect of any pre-filing
conduct will occur, but in a nationwide class action, the lawyers
may not know in advance where the class action lawsuit will be
filed, or it may be that several class actions will be filed
simultaneously. 68 Further complicating the analysis of ethical
issues in class actions is the difficulty of determining the identity
of the class lawyer's client (or clients), 69 particularly during the
time prior to the filing of a class action lawsuit, when the lawyer
may be actively investigating the case or even negotiating a
potential settlement with defense counsel. 70
66. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action
Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1477-1478 (2003) [hereinafter Moore,
Who Should Regulate?].
67. See, e.g., In re School "Asbestos Litigation," 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.
1986).
68. And, of course, the defense lawyers will have even less information
regarding the location of any class action that might be filed, even when they
know or have reason to believe that one or more lawsuits is imminent. See
Daly, supra note 7, at 759-760.
69. See, e.g., Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 66 at 1482-1489
(arguing that the class should be viewed as an entity client).
70. I have been retained as an expert witness several times in connection
with situations in which lawyers representing a putative class engaged in
negotiations with defense lawyers with a view toward filing a settlement
class action. In these situations, there was confusion on the part of the
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Once a lawsuit is filed, subsection (b)(1) comes into play,
and much (if not necessarily all) of the lawyers' conduct will be
governed by the rules of the forum jurisdiction. 71 In many cases,
however, similar lawsuits (either individual or representative) will
be pending in different jurisdictions. What if they are formally
aggregated for various purposes in a single jurisdiction?72 If they
are aggregated for all purposes, then presumably the rules in the
now-single forum will control (at least those issues as to which
(b)(1) applies 73). But what if the aggregation is only for limited
purposes, such as discovery? Is it clear that the rules of the single
forum control as to all conduct that occurs while the cases are
pending in that forum? What if the lawyer's activities (or even
more likely, their effects) span a time frame covering not only the
initial filings, but also the transfer to a single forum and then the
retransfer back to the courts where the proceedings were initially
filed?
Aside from formal aggregation of multiple lawsuits,
aggregation can occur informally; for example, when a single
lawyer represents multiple clients with related claims against one
or more defendants, which claims may be filed or unfiled. 74 The
lawyer may proceed with these claims in a coordinated fashion,
often working with one or more other lawyers pursuing similar
claims, as in many mass tort lawsuits; the defendants may also
proceed in a coordinated manner, creating networks or hierarchies
of lawyers providing coordinated responses to separate claims. 75
Given that some of the cases may be filed while other are not, will
the same conduct be subject simultaneously to both (b)(1) and
(b)(2)?
putative class action lawyers regarding the identity of their client or clients,
as well as the nature and scope of their duties toward the putative class, the
putative class representatives and the putative class members.
71. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
72. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 58 § 1.02(b) cmt. b(2).
73. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
74. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 58 § 1.02 cmt. b(3); see generally
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519.
75. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 58 § 1.02 cmt. b(3); see also Judith
Resnick, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 2119, 2126 (2000).
90 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 14:73
Consider a plaintiffs' lawyer who is asked to enter into an
aggregate settlement with one of the defendants.76 Currently,
virtually all states have adopted the same or a similar text in
their versions of Model Rule 1.8(g), 77 under which a lawyer may
not enter into an aggregate settlement "unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client... [which] shall
include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved
and of the participation of each person in the settlement. ' 78 The
Reporters of the ALI Principles of Aggregate Litigation are
proposing to change this rule in order to facilitate advance waivers
of the right to refuse to participate in an aggregate settlement. 79
If the Reporters' proposal is approved by the ALI, some
jurisdictions may adopt these changes, but others may not. Which
jurisdiction's aggregate settlement rule will apply? Will the
outcome differ depending on whether the claims are filed or
unfiled or whether the waiver occurred before or after any
filing?80 As to any unfiled claims, will the lawyer's conduct be
found to occur in the various locales where the settlement was
negotiated, where, for example, the lawyer may have agreed with
the defendant's request that that claimants be given information
only about their own individual settlement offers, in violation of
the current Rule 1.8(g)?8 1 Or will the conduct be found to occur in
the jurisdiction (or jurisdictions) where the lawyer prepared and
mailed arguably deficient notices of the settlement proposal, or
76. For a proposed definition of a non-class aggregate settlement see ALI
PRINCIPLES supra 58, § 3.16.
77. Id. § 3.15 cmt. b
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007).
79. See generally Moore, ALI's Draft Proposal, supra note 63, at 395-402.
At the May 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, I co-
authored a motion to delete those portions of the Reporters' proposals that
would change the current aggregate settlement rule. After extensive debate,
the Reporters agreed to reconsider their proposal, and the motion was tabled.
80. Under the Reporters' proposal, waivers could be executed at any time
prior to the negotiation of an aggregate settlement, including at the time of
the lawyer's retention. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 58, § 3.17(b) (client
may agree in advance to be bound by collective decisionmaking "whether
proceedings have commenced or not"); § 3.17(c) (advance consent may be
"part of the lawyer's or group of lawyers' retainer agreement or at any other
point during the course of the litigation").
81. See ABA COMM'N. ON ETHICS AND PROF'L RESP., Formal Op. 438 (2006)
(interpreting the rule to require disclosure of the details of every other
client's participation in the aggregate settlement).
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perhaps in the various jurisdictions where the individual
claimants received and acted (or failed to act) on such notices?
Moreover, the refusal of some claimants to agree to the proposal
may have the effect of undoing the settlement as to a majority of
claimants who approved the settlement.82 So where is the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct if the lawyer is alleged
to have violated at least one jurisdiction's version of the rule in
notifying both the approving claimants and the holdouts, who may
reside in different states? And will defense counsel be bound by
the same version of the rule as plaintiffs' counsel? 83
As with the more ordinary two-party lawsuit, aggregate
litigation poses even greater difficulties in choosing among
different jurisdictions' professional responsibility laws when the
issues are raised, as they often are, in proceedings other than
lawyer discipline. For example, in Daynard v. Ness,84 a law
professor licensed in New York and teaching in Massachusetts
brought an action in a federal district court in Massachusetts
seeking to enforce an oral fee splitting agreement entered into in
Illinois with lawyers from Mississippi and South Carolina, with
respect to multiple lawsuits filed in different jurisdictions on
behalf of certain state governments against the tobacco industry.
As the court noted, the five relevant jurisdictions it identified 85
differed in their approaches to such issues as to whether the client
must consent to a division of fees and whether the consent must
be in writing.8 6 In addition, the jurisdictions differed in their
82. See Moore, AL's Draft Proposal, supra note 63, at 401-403
(explaining that the current aggregate settlement rule does not necessarily
give each client a veto over the settlement of other claims, but the defendant
may condition the effectiveness of any settlement on the approval of a certain
number of claimants).
83. In the typical case, where it is the plaintiffs who are being asked to
settle their claims in the aggregate, defense counsel is not governed directly
by Rule 1.8(g). Nevertheless, under Rule 8.4(a), defense counsel may not
knowingly "assist or induce" another lawyer to violate the rules of
professional conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a). I was
retained as an expert witness in a case where a corporation that was the
defendant in an aggregate products liability lawsuit was sued by the former
plaintiffs on the basis of defense counsel's alleged misconduct in entering into
an aggregate settlement with the former plaintiffs' counsel.
84. 178 F.Supp.2d at 9-11.
85. For reasons not explained the court did not consider any of the
jurisdictions where the tobacco lawsuits were filed.
86. 178 F.Supp.2d at 14-16.
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approaches to the enforceability of such an agreement. 87
The court separately analyzed the choice of law issues for
determining the ethical propriety of the lawyers' conduct and the
enforceability of an unethical fee-splitting agreement. 88 As for the
ethical propriety of the lawyers' conduct, the court concluded that
although the laws of the relevant jurisdictions were different, "the
choice of law rule for the rules of professional conduct" was the
same. 89 According to the court, all five jurisdictions followed the
approach of the 1993 version of Rule 8.5(b)(2), under which a
lawyer licensed in only one state will be governed solely by the
rules of that state. 90 Because all of the lawyers happened to be
licensed in only one jurisdiction, the court quickly concluded that
each lawyer was subject to the rules of his licensing jurisdiction. 91
Of course, if some of the lawyers had been licensed in multiple
jurisdictions, the choice-of-law decision would not have been this
easy. More important, the court failed to explain why it chose to
follow subsection (b)(2) and not subsection (b)(1), given that the
agreement appeared to have been made during a period in which
all or some of the lawsuits were pending. Had it noted that
lawsuits were pending, it would have been forced to decide, first,
whether the conduct was "connected with" any or all of the various
lawsuits, and second, whether the propriety of the lawyers'
conduct in entering into the single fee-splitting agreement should
87. Id. at 16-18.
88. Id. at 12-13 (stating that all of the jurisdictions agreed that if the fee
splitting agreement was unenforceable, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in
quantum meruit).
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 18-19. In my view, the court's conclusion that all five
jurisdictions followed Model Rule 8.5 with respect to the treatment of lawyers
licensed by only one state was incorrect. As the court itself noted,
Massachusetts had adopted only subsection (a) of the 1993 Model Rule, not
subsection (b), and both South Carolina and Mississippi were still using the
original version of the rule. As a result, none of those three jurisdictions had
an explicit choice of law rule, regardless of whether the lawyer was licensed
in one or more than one jurisdiction. Absent an explicit choice of law rule,
courts were most likely to apply general choice-of-law principles. See supra
note 11 and accompanying text. See also Mass. Supreme Judicial Court
Invites Comments on Proposed Change to Professional Conduct Rule," supra
note 29 (stating that in the absence of explicit choice of law provision, "the
general multi-factor 'significant interests' test of conflict of laws has
presumably been the governing principles in Massachusetts professional
responsibility matters").
91. 178 F.Supp.2d at 19.
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differ according to the rules of each forum state.
As for the enforceability of unethical fee division
agreements, the court discussed without deciding how traditional
choice of law principles might apply in choosing the contract law
of the relevant states. 92 In one sense, this discussion was easier
than the first choice-of-law question, because federal courts are
bound to follow the substantive law of the forum in which they sit,
including the forum state's choice-of-law provisions; thus, there
was no difficulty determining whose choice-of-law approach
governed. 93 Nevertheless, applying the "functional choice of law
approach" followed by Massachusetts entailed an extensive
analysis of various factors set forth in the Second Restatement. 94
Moreover, the analysis was complicated by the fact that, unlike
extensive choice-of-law treatment of traditional contracts, no court
in either Massachusetts, Mississippi, or South Carolina had
addressed the relationship between contract law and the ethical
aspects of fee-splitting agreements. 95 As one of the few opinions to
directly address the myriad of difficult choice-of-law issues that
might be raised in aggregate litigation, Daynard should give
pause to anyone who continues to think that litigation choice-of-
law issues will be easily resolved, in either two-party or aggregate
litigation.96
92. Id. at 19-27.
93. Id. at 19-20.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 22.
96. After a lengthy preliminary discussion of the choice-of-law issues this
case raised, the court concluded with the following:
None of the preceding authorities has suggested what should happen
if the plaintiff and defendant are subject to different rules of
professional conduct, the plaintiff complied with his rules of
professional conduct, the defendant did not comply with his rules of
professional conduct, the state that licensed the plaintiff would not
use public policy to defeat imperfect fee-splitting agreements, the
state that licensed the defendant would use public policy to defeat
imperfect fee-splitting agreements, the state with the most interest
in the agreement is the state that licensed the defendant, and the
plaintiff is suing in a state that did not license any of the lawyers in
the dispute. This is the conundrum potentially facing this Court but
completely ignored by the parties. Accordingly, the parties have been
given an opportunity to rectify their silence with supplemental
briefing.
Id. at 27.
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CONCLUSION
Given the choice-of-law uncertainties that exist in both two-
party and aggregate litigation, some might argue that the 1993
version of Rule 8.5 was preferable because its ambiguities were
more limited. But predictability in application is not necessarily
the most important goal of a choice-of-law provision. The 1993
version of Rule 8.5 was deficient because it ignored the legitimate
interests not only of clients, but also of jurisdictions other than the
ones where a lawyer is licensed, 97 and failed to recognize the
extent to which lawyers now practice, if only temporarily, in
jurisdictions where they are unlicensed. Whether the current
version is a sufficient improvement remains to be seen, but at
least it recognizes, far more than its predecessor, the increasing
complexity of the choice-of-law issues arising in today's global
environment. Moreover, at least in disciplinary proceedings, the
current version takes into account the difficulty of prediction
through the use of a safe harbor provision that protects lawyers
making reasonable choices in the face of uncertainty.
What is not sufficiently acknowledged, even today, is the
complexity of choice-of-law issues in at least some litigated
matters. Yes, the current rule has eliminated the previous
ambiguity regarding the application of subsection (b)(1) to pre-
litigation conduct, but problems remain when a lawyer's conduct
begins pre-filing and then continues while the litigation is
pending, such as when a fee agreement is modified or a conflict of
interest worsens as the litigation proceeds. Also, because
professional responsibility issues so frequently arise in contexts
other than disciplinary proceedings, such as fee disputes,
disqualification and malpractice, courts cannot rely entirely on
Rule 8.5, particularly its safe-harbor provisions, but rather must
look to more traditional choice-of-law principles to resolve these
disputes.
Of course, the difficulties facing judges, lawyers, and
litigants in resolving these professional responsibility choice-of-
law dilemmas will be magnified in aggregate litigation. This is not
unexpected, given that aggregate litigation raises a host of
complex substantive and procedural questions, including the
97. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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choice-of-law questions addressed in the remainder of the papers
in this symposium issue. It is disappointing that the professional
responsibility aspects of aggregate litigation are so seldom
addressed, but I believe that, too, will change. My hope is that this
brief essay will encourage lawyers to confront these issues before
they are raised in court, at a time when they can make reasoned
choices regarding their conduct. And if there are changes in the
professional responsibility rules that can enhance predictability
without sacrificing the interests of clients or host jurisdictions,
then the profession should remain open to exploring those
changes.
